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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BILLIE J. CHAPMAN, / 
Plaintiff/Appellee, / Case No. 940191-CA 
v. / District Court No. 
924701083 
HORACE A. CHAPMAN, / 
Defendant/Appellant. / Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2A-3(2)(i), which 
provides that the Court of Appeals has Appellant 
jurisdiction over appeals from the District Court 
involving domestic relations cases, including but not 
limited to divorce and property division. Rule 3 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure also indicates a 
procedure for taking appeals from Judgments and Orders of 
Trial Courts. This Brief follows the structural 
requirements outlined in Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure. This is a Brief by Billie J. 
Chapman, Plaintiff, in support of a Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce entered below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in 
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making the award of alimony that it did. 
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in its assessment 
of values and division of marital assets and property. 
3. Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding wife 
partial attorney's fees. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
ALIMONY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. The standard of review on 
appeal with regard to an alimony issue is that the Trial 
Court is given considerable discretion and a Trial 
Court's decision will not be over turned on appeal unless 
there is a clear and prejudicial abuse of that discretion 
and so long as the Trial Court exercises its discretion 
within the appropriate legal standards. Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 811 (Utah App. 1992), Johnson v. 
Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993). 
PROPERTY DIVISION • The standard of review on appeal with 
regard to issues of division of property is that a Trial 
Court has considerable discretion in adjusting financial 
and property interests of the parties. The Court of 
Appeals will not disturb the Trial Court's decision 
unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Smith v. Smith. 751 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Honorable W. Brent West, District 
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Court Judge on or about June 20, 1994 (R. at 226). At 
trial, Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Attorney 
Pete N. Vlahos. Defendant appeared and was represented 
by Attorney G. Scott Jensen. During the trial, numerous 
witnesses were called and testified with regard to 
evaluation of property. In addition, both Plaintiff and 
Defendant testified with regard to issues surrounding 
alimony. 
Judge West issued a decision dated February 24, 1994 
(R. at 165-173). Plaintiff's attorney prepared a 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce and forwarded same to Defendant's attorney, 
James M. Retallick on or about June 10, 1994 (R. at 234). 
Defendant's counsel filed a Notice to Appeal with the 
Clerk of the Court, Second Judicial District, Davis 
County on March 26, 1994. Said Notice was entered on 
March 28, 1994 (R. at 177). Defendant appeals the Trial 
Court's alimony award, valuation and division of certain 
property and attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties to this divorce were married March 18, 
1960 (T. Vol. I, P. 93). During the marriage, husband 
worked for the Union Pacific Railroad and at the time of 
trial, had been so employed for a period of about thirty-
five (35) years (T. Vol. II, P. 46). Plaintiff worked as 
a waitress for the first seventeen (17) years of marriage 
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and then did not work for a period of approximately ten 
(10) or twelve (12) years (T. Vol. II, P. 157). 
Plaintiff then worked on a seasonal basis as a waitress 
for the four (4) years immediately prior to the divorce 
(T. Vol. II, P. 157 & 158). Plaintiff did no other work 
besides waitressing and had no other special training or 
skills. At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff and 
Defendant had been married for a period of thirty-three 
and a half (33 1/2) years (T. Vol. II, P. 246). The 
parties had five (5) children together, all of whom were 
emancipated at the time of the divorce (T. Vol. I, P. 
94). 
Defendant worked as an engineer for Union Pacific 
Railroad, working primarily from Millford, Utah to Las 
Vegas, Nevada. Defendant historically worked 
approximately eighty (80) to one hundred (100) hours per 
week for the railroad (T. Vol. II, P. 93). The parties 
acquired a number of items of property, including a home 
in Bountiful, Utah, a home and service garage in 
Millford, Utah and a condominium in St. George, Utah. In 
addition, the Defendant collected and restored antique 
cars and other collectible items and various other items 
of personal property were acquired. Plaintiff filed for 
a divorce seeking alimony, a division of the marital 
assets, a division of husband1 s retirement and attorney's 
fees. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 - There are adequate findings and a record 
made by the Trial Court to support the award of alimony. 
Plaintiff was awarded $1,100.00 per month as permanent 
alimony, which amount was arrived at by considering the 
financial condition and need of the Plaintiff, the 
ability of the Plaintiff to provide sufficient income for 
herself and the ability of the Defendant to provide that 
support. 
ARGUMENT 2 - A Trial Court has wide discretion in its 
assessment of values and a division of marital assets and 
property. The Trial Court spent considerable time and 
effort in arriving at values and in the division of 
property and did not abuse its discretion in making that 
property division. 
ARGUMENT 3 - The Trial Court did not err in awarding the 
Plaintiff partial attorney's fees. Plaintiff's need for 
payment of attorney's fees was adequately demonstrated 
and the record supports Defendant had the financial 
ability to pay and contribute toward Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees. 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF ALIMONY IN THE AMOUNT OF $lf100.00. 
Plaintiff accepts Defendant's position that the 
general purpose of alimony is to prevent the receiving 
spouse from becoming a public charge and to maintain the 
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standard of living enjoyed during the marriage to the 
extent possible. Howell v. Howell . 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 
(Utah App.), cert denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). The 
factors in making a determination of alimony are well 
established in Utah law. The three (3) main factors for 
an alimony award are (1), the financial condition and 
need of the receiving spouse; (2), the ability of the 
receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for 
herself; and (3), the ability of the paying spouse to 
provide support. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 
1992). Plaintiff believes that the Court adequately 
considered each of these factors when it made its award 
of alimony. 
A. The Trial Court adequately addressed the ability 
of the receiving spouse to produce income for herself. 
Defendant argues that the Trial Court committed 
error in not finding the wife voluntarily under employed 
for purposes of calculating alimony. However, the Trial 
Court addresses this issue when it discusses the ability 
of the Plaintiff to produce sufficient income for 
herself. Relevant findings of fact on this issue include 
the following: 
3. That this is a long term 
marriage, in that the parties have 
been married for thirty-four (34) 
years. During the marriage, both 
parties have worked, however not to 
the same degree. The Plaintiff has 
worked for portions of the marriage 
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as a waitress and her most recent 
employment is at Bountiful Golf 
Course, and the Defendant has worked 
thirty-five (35) years for the Union 
Pacific Railroad. 
6. That the Plaintiff has a gross 
monthly income of $838.00 when she 
is employed, and that the 
Defendant's gross monthly income is 
$5,279.91. 
7. That the Plaintiff's monthly 
expenses are $1,837.00, and the 
Defendant's monthly expenses are 
$3,941.43 and with few exceptions, 
the expenses appear to be both 
reasonable and necessary for both 
parties. 
Finally, the Court enters the following findings of 
fact: 
8. That the Court finds that 
despite the Plaintiff's ability to 
work, the Plaintiff is in need of 
support, and that the Defendant has 
the ability to provide such support, 
(emphasis added) (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, R. P. 207-
208) 
The Trial Court treated Plaintiff as if she were 
working full time on a permanent basis. It did this by 
making a specific finding that Plaintiff had a gross 
income of $838.58 per month. The Trial Court did not 
distinguish between times that the Plaintiff was working 
and not working because it made no finding as to her 
income when not working. Rather, alimony was based on a 
set figure of $838.58 a month for all months. Alimony 
award was based on a figure treating the Plaintiff as if 
7 
she were working full time. It is therefore immaterial 
as to whether Plaintiff was capable of working full time 
because the alimony award was made as if treating the 
Plaintiff as a full time employee. 
Further, the Court did not have to make a specific 
order with regard to the Plaintiff being voluntarily 
under employed for purposes of alimony. This is because 
the Court entered specific findings as to the wife's 
income. The Court specifically found that Plaintiff had 
income of $838.58 per month and that her expenses were 
$1,837.00 per month. This creates a deficit for the 
Plaintiff of $998.42. The Court was also well aware of 
the fact that Plaintiff worked approximately six (6) 
months of the year and that she drew unemployment for the 
other six (6) months of the year because she liked her 
job at the golf course (T. Vol. I, P. 154 & 155). The 
Court was further aware that while drawing unemployment, 
the Plaintiff averaged $432.00 per month during the six 
(6) months that she was unemployed and that Plaintiff 
averaged her income while working and unemployed to 
arrive at a monthly estimate of income (T. Vol. I, P. 161 
& 162). 
In addition, the parties discussed the Plaintiff's 
period of unemployment at trial. This exchange took 
place as follows: 
MR. JENSEN: No; I am just asking -
I don't see why I can't ask her why 
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she can't go look for another job. 
THE COURT: You are asking -
MR. VLAHOS: You can ask her that, 
but you can't say, "you make more 
money," because you don't know. You 
are assuming something that is not. 
THE COURT: You are. You are 
assuming that she could make more 
money without a basis for doing 
that. You have never asked her if 
she has looked or if there are other 
things she is qualified for, if she 
made more money as a waitress. I 
agree. You get to ask her why she 
doesn't leave the golf course and go 
to another job; but you made the 
assumption that she could make more 
money, and I don't have a basis for 
that now. 
Q (BY MR. JENSEN): Have you looked 
for other jobs? 
A: Not since I have been at the 
golf course. I like my job. 
Q: So you haven't looked for other 
jobs? 
A: No. (T. Vol. I, P. 223 & 224) 
It is therefore, abundantly clear that the Court 
considered the Plaintiff's condition of employment. It 
is equally clear that if the facts in the record are 
"clear, uncontroverted, incapable of supporting a finding 
in favor of the Judgment, tfieo the CourU of Appeals will 
not disturb the Trial Court's decision." Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988), (quoting Acton 
v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, it is clear from the record and the 
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testimony at the trial, that the Court did consider 
Plaintiff's employment situation, was well aware of the 
fact that she was not employed for six (6) months of the 
year and thus considered that in making its alimony 
award. Alimony was based on a set figure without 
distinguishing times of employment versus unemployment. 
B. The Trial Court adequately considered 
Defendant's ability to pay. 
The ability of a paying spouse to provide support is 
one (1) of three (3) main factors to consider in making 
an alimony award. In this case, the Trial Court made the 
following findings relevant to the Defendant's ability to 
pay. 
6. That the Plaintiff has a gross 
monthly income of $838.00 when she 
is employed and that the Defendant's 
gross monthly income is $5,279.91. 
7. That the Plaintiff's monthly 
expenses are $1,837.00, and the 
Defendant's monthly expenses are 
$3,941.43 and with few exceptions, 
the expenses appear to be both 
reasonable and necessary for both 
parties. 
8. That the Court finds that 
despite the Plaintiff's ability to 
work, the Plaintiff is in need of 
support and that the Defendant has 
the ability to provide such support. 
Defendant then argues, for the first time on appeal, 
that the Court failed to consider the withholdings for 
taxes and other benefits from the Defendant's earnings, 
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and that this leaves him with a deficit each month. 
Defendant then submits an addendum, not submitted as an 
exhibit at trial, in support of that argument. 
Initially, it should be noted that the Court heard 
evidence, in detail, from the Defendant with regard to 
deductions from his income. This is noted as follows: 
Q (BY MR. JENSEN): Now, we could go 
through that, that pay stub. I 
would like you to explain some of 
the items that are deducted from 
your check, if you could. (T. Vol. 
II, P. 41). 
Defendant then goes through each of the deductions 
from his income and outlines those for the Cour t. This 
is followed by a discussion of the expenses incurred by 
the Defendant and each of those are outlined for the 
Court and submitted i n the form of Exhibit No. 2 4 for Irho 
Court's review. Therefore, the Court was well aware of 
Defendant's claim as to his disposable income. 
Second, it should be noted that the Coiu 
not take the highest figure that they could have on 
Defendant's income. Defendant testified that based upon 
the pay stub being showed to the Court at that time, that 
he made $2,838.00 gross income for that pay period. If 
one were to take that figure, multiply it by 26 on the 
basis that there are twenty-six (26) pay peri ods I n a 
year and then divide that by 12, Defendant's gross income 
become1 ii $f-i, 14 9.00 a month. That this is more than 
$900.00 a month more than the Court found Defendants 
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income to be. Therefore, any error committed by the 
Court is balanced by findings that are in the Defendant's 
favor. 
Third, the Court did not consider Plaintiff's 
deductions from income either. 
Finally, on review, an Appellant Court will not 
upset the Trial Court's award so long as the Trial Court 
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal 
standards. The Trial Court in this case specifically 
addressed Defendant's ability to pay and is well aware of 
all deductions from income. The Trial Court, therefore, 
did not abuse its discretion in the award of alimony and 
the action is consistent with the purposes of an alimony 
award as articulated by this Court. See Johnson v. 
Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993). 
In addition, the described purpose of alimony is as 
follows: "The most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible to the 
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English 
v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). An alimony 
award should, to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties respective post divorce living standards and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Rasband 
v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Based upon the findings of the Court, Plaintiff has 
a gross monthly income of $838.00. When you add her 
alimony award to that, Plaintiff's income reaches 
$1,938.00 a month. Plaintiff# s month1y expenses a re 
$1,837.00, which leaves her with a disposable income of 
$101.00 a month. The Defendant's income is $5,279.91, 
When you buntrai t his monthly expenses and alimony from 
that figure, Defendant is left with discretionary income 
of $238.48 per month. This also does not consider the 
fact that al i mony :i s taxabl e i ncome to Plaintiff and 
deductible to Defendant, and that of their combined 
income, Defendant makes 64.4% and Plaintiff makes 38.6%. 
This both puts the parties at rough] y the same standard 
of living and approximately equalizes the parties 
respective post divorce living standards. 
POINT 2; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS ASSESSMENT 
OF VALUES AND DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS AND PROPERTY. 
Defendant cites two (2) areas in which he maintains 
the Trial Court erred in assessing and dividing marital 
assets and property. The first of these is that the 
Trial Court erred in assessing value to the garage in 
Millfor d The second i s that the Trial Court erred in 
its valuation of certain other items ot; personal 
property. 
It is a well established rule that: a Trial Courl: in 
a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in 
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adjusting financial and property interest of parties, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P. 2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). 
Further, the burden is on the Defendant to overcome that 
presumption of validity. This was outlined in Arcryle v. 
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984), which notes as follows: 
A party appealing from a property 
division has the burden to prove 
that there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law, resulting 
in substantial and prejudicial 
error; or the evidence clearly 
preponderated against the findings; 
or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court made specific 
findings as to the garage in Millford. It noted as 
follows: 
The parties also have a garage in 
Millford, Utah. This garage was 
purchased for $18,000.00. The 
Plaintiff claims the garage is worth 
$10,357.00. The Defendant claims 
the garage is worth $13,000.00. 
However, the garage has been 
condemned by Millford City. The 
Defendant has been ordered to 
demolish the garage. He claims that 
the cost of demolition will be 
greater than its present value and 
therefore the garage has no value. 
The Court is satisfied that the 
garage has some value and will place 
that value at the lower figure of 
$10,357.00. 
Simply because the Defendant does not agree with the 
Court's decision does not mean that the decision is 
incorrect or an abuse of discretion. It is clear that 
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the Court had all the Information in 1 ront of" il and 
having considered that evidence, fixed the garage's value 
at the lower figure offered by the Plaintiff. This is no 
different than any of the other property division set nut 
by the Court. Many times, the Court would accept 
Defendant's valuation over the Plaintiff's and many 
times, Lhe Court would find its own value based on the 
testimony of the parties. This is clearly within the 
Court's discretion to do so. 
11 :i its decision, the Court went through each piece 
of real estate and fixed its value. The Court then noted 
the total value of the real property assets was 
$151,839.40. The Court then found that each party had a 
share of these assets of $75,919.70. Assuming that the 
Court valued the garage in Millford at $10,357.00, each 
party would be entitled to one-half (1/2) of" this value 
or $5,178.50. This sum is minimal when compared with the 
total value of all property in the divorce. 
Between real property, personal property and 
household goods, the parties have had estate of 
$266,574.90. This figure is arrived at by taking the 
Court's valuation of real property, personal property and 
household goods as set forth in its decision. Each party 
is to receive one-half (1/2) of that value or 
$133,287.45, Therefore, even if this Court accepts 
Defendant's argument that the Court abused its 
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discretion, the value in that garage in Millford is less 
than 3/10ths of 1% of the total value of assets awarded 
to the Defendant. 
Defendant then further alleges the Trial Court erred 
in its valuation of certain items of marital property. 
In support of this, he notes what he believes to be 
discrepancies in valuation of a 1986 Harley Davidson 
motorcycle with a side car, the valuation of three (3) 
Cushman scooters and the valuation of two (2) slot 
machines. Again, a Trial Court is permitted considerable 
discretion in adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties and its actions are entitled to 
a presumption of validity as set forth above in the 
Aroyle case. 
Simply because the Trial Court accepts Plaintiff's 
valuation over Defendant's valuation does not rebut that 
presumption of validity. Many other factors play into 
the division of property, including the creditability of 
the parties, their disposition and actions at trial and 
the Court's own experience. Even assuming that Defendant 
is completely correct in his valuation, there is a total 
difference of $4,007.50 between the amount the Court set 
as values for these items of property and the amount that 
Defendant claimed their value to be. Again, this amount 
is so minuscule in comparison with the over all property 
division, that it cannot be said there is an abuse of 
16 
discretion. 
POINT 3: THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING WIFE 
PARTIAL ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
There are generally three (3 ) factors i n determining 
an award of attorney's fee. These factors include 
financial need of the parties, the reasonableness of the 
fees and which party prevails on disputed issues. See 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988) 
and Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990). 
Both a. decision to award a ttorneyj s fees an 
amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of 
the Court. Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah 
App. 1991). In the case at bar, the Defendant;, does 
contest the reasonableness of the fee. Therefore, the 
remaining issue is Plaintiff's need and which party 
prevailed. 
From the outset, it is believed that neither 
Plaintiff or Defendant entirely prevailed in the action. 
This is further supported by the Trial Court's actual 
findings where it notes as follows: 
I n tll^s case^ t h e piaintiff has 
incurred approximately $4#000.00 in 
attorney's fees and $350.00 in Court 
costs. The Defendant has incurred 
similar amounts. The Plaintiff is 
in need of financial assistance in 
paying her attorney's fees. The 
Defendant has the financial ability 
to assist the Plaintiff. The 
Plaintiff has not, however, 
prevailed on all the contested 
issues. As a result, the Defendant 
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is ordered to contribute $2,000.00 
toward the payment of Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees. Each party is to 
bear their own costs. 
Therefore, the Trial Court did not award Plaintiff 
the entire amount of attorney's fees incurred on the 
basis that she did not entirely prevail on contested 
issues. It is presumed, therefore, that the award of 
$2,000.00 toward payment of attorney's fees was based on 
Plaintiff's need. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law have 
clearly shown that Plaintiff lacks the ability to pay the 
fees. Plaintiff was only making, pursuant to the 
findings, $838.00 per month. Defendant, on the other 
hand, had a gross monthly income of $5,279.91 per month. 
At the time of trial, therefore, Defendant was in a much 
better position for the payment of attorney's fees. 
Plaintiff adequately demonstrated need for payment of 
those attorney's fees, considering the disparate 
financial position that she was in at the time of trial. 
The Court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the 
law with regard to its award of attorney's fees and 
therefore the attorney's fees should stand as awarded. 
CONCLaSION 
The Court of Appeals will not upset a Trial Court's 
award so long as the Court has exercised its discretion 
within the appropriate legal standards. Appropriate 
legal standards are considered when the Court properly 
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views the financial condition and need of the receiv.inq 
spouse, the ability of the receiving spouse to produce 
income and the ability of a paying spouse to provide 
support. Each of these factors were adequate"„ -. 
considered, both in the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and within the record itself. The Court fixed the 
Plaintiff * s Income at $838,00 per month, even though she 
does not always make that amount. The Defendant's 
argument that the Court treated her as under employed is 
without merit. Defendant has the ability to provi de 
support. Defendant's income substantially exceeds that 
of the Plaintiffs. This is a thirty-four (34) year 
marriage. The Cour t viewed and accepted Defendant's 
explanation of both his income, deductions and expenses. 
Plaintiff's expenses clearly exceed her income. She has 
therefore demonstrate* financial need for alimony. 
The disparities 'lie property division which 
Defendant complains of are so minuscule when compared to 
the over all division of the parties' property, that the 
Court cannot be said to have abused its discretion. Even 
then, this Court must rely on the Trial Court's 
discretion with regard to that division. The Trial Court 
earnestly attempted to make an equal division of 
property. The fact that it did not accept the 
Defendant's estimates as to value on certain items c 
property does not mean that its property division is 
19 
inequitable. 
The Plaintiff demonstrated a need for payment of 
attorney's fees. There is no issue that the attorney's 
fees were reasonable. The Court reduced the amount of 
fees awarded to the Plaintiff on the basis that she did 
not prevail on all contested issues. As a result, all 
factors were properly considered and the Court did not 
abuse its discretion with regard to making the award of 
attorney's fees that it did. 
Based upon the above and foregoing, Defendant's 
appeal should be dismissed, the Trial Court's decision 
affirmed and Plaintiff should be awarded the costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this ^-f-——day of February, 1995. 
VLAHOS, SHARP & BRADLEY 
N. VLAHQ6, ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Appellee was posted in the 
United Stat>\s mail, postage prepaid and addressed to 
Attorney James M. Retallick, attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, at Key Bank Building, Suite 200, 
2491 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, otah 84401 on this 
day of February, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM 
Decis ion 1-10 
ADDENDUM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE JEAN CHAPMAN, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
HORACE ALBERT CHAPMAN, 
Defendant(s). 
DECISION 
Case No. 924701083 
There are four issues that the court took under advisement. 
These include alimony, distribution of retirement, distribution 
of real and personal property and attorney's fees. The court will 
address each issue separately. 
ALIMONY 
This is a long term marriage. The parties have been married 
for 34 years. During the marriage, both parties have worked, 
however, not to the same degree. The plaintiff has worked, for 
portions of the marriage, as a waitress. Her most recent 
employment is at the Bountiful Golf Course. The defendant has 
worked 35 years with the Union Pacific Railroad. 
The plaintiff's gross monthly income is $838.58. The 
defendant's gross monthly income is $5,279.91. 
The plaintiff's monthly expenses are $1,837.00. The 
defendant's monthly expenses are $3,941.43. With few exceptions, 
the expenses appear to be both reasonable and necessary. 
Despite her ability to work, the plaintiff is in need of 
support. The defendant has the ability to provide such support. 
An award of alimony is appropriate. The alimony award should be 
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permanent. It should be modified only on death, remarriage or 
other material change in circumstances. Based on the parties 
financial conditions, the court awards the plaintiff $1,100.00 a 
month in alimony. 
RETIREMENT 
The plaintiff is awarded her proportionate share of the 
defendant's railroad retirement, pursuant to the Woodward 
formula. This would apply to any retirement benefits that the 
defendant has accrued under Tier II of the railroad retirement. 
However, the defendant has approximately 9 more years before he 
will be eligible for Tier II benefits. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
This is the most difficult area to address. The primary 
issue is value. For clarity, the court will divide its analysis 
into two parts, real property and personal property. 
Real Property: There are 6 pieces of real property, These 
include the parties home in Bountiful, Utah; a home in Milford, 
Utah; a condominium in St. George, Utah; a garage in St. George, 
Utah; a garage in Milford, Utah; and a storage shed in Bountiful, 
Utah. The values that the parties have placed on these properties 
are extremely divergent. Once again, the court will address each 
piece of property individually. 
The parties purchased their home in Bountiful, Utah for 
$70,000.00. The plaintiff claims the home has a value of 
$80,000.00. The defendant claims the home is worth $95,000.00. 
The court is satisfied with defendant's appraisal and values the 
home at $95,000.00. 
The parties purchased their home in Milford, Utah for 
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$12,000.00. The plaintiff claims the home is worth $10,725.00. 
The defendant claims the home is worth only $7,000.00. Although 
property values have gone down in Milford, the court is satisfied 
that the home is worth $10,725.00. 
The parties purchased a condominium in St. George, Utah 
for $79,000.00. The balance due and owing on the mortgage is 
$67,492.60. The plaintiff claims the condominium is worth 
$85,000.00. The defendant claims it is worth $79,000.00. The 
court finds the value to be $85,000.00. 
In addition to the condominium in St. George, Utah, the 
parties also have a garage there. The plaintiff claims the garage 
is worth $5,000.00. The defendant claims the garage is worth 
$3,500.00. The court finds the value to be $4,250.00. 
The parties also have a garage in Milford, Utah. This 
garage was purchased for $18,000.00. The plaintiff claims the 
garage is worth $10,357.00. The defendant claims the garage is 
worth $13,000.00. However, the garage has been condemned by 
Milford City. The defendant has been ordered to demolish the 
garage. He claims that the cost of demolition will be greater 
than its present value and therefore the garage has no value. The 
court is satisfied that the garage has some value and will place 
that value at the lower figure of $10,357.00. 
The last real estate item for consideration is the 
storage shed in Bountiful, Utah. This item is complicated by the 
fact that the shed is located on property belonging to the 
defendant's mother. The plaintiff claims the shed is worth 
$15,000.00. The defendant claims it cost $14,000.00 to build the 
shed. The court is satisfied with the $14,000.00 figure. 
The plaintiff is awarded the home in Bountiful, Utah. 
The defendant is awarded the house in Milford, Utah; the garage 
in Milford, Utah; the condominium in St. George, Utah; the garage 
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in St. George, Utah; and any interest in the storage shed in 
Bountiful, Utah. 
The total value of these assets is $151,839,40. Since 
this is a long term marriage and all the properties were obtained 
with marital assets, the only equitable way to divide these 
assets is equally. Each parties share of these assets is 
$75,919.70. Since the plaintiff has been awarded the home in 
Bountiful, Utah and it has a value of $95,000.00, the defendant 
is awarded a lien against the home in the amount of $19,080.30. 
The lien is payable in 9 years or when the defendant retires or 
when the Bountiful home is sold, whichever event occurs first. 
This will equalize the parties interest in these properties. 
Personal Property: This is, without a doubt, the most 
difficult area to resolve. It is complicated by the large number 
of items, the various age of the items, the fact that many of the 
items are in various stages of restoration and the divergent 
values placed on the items by the parties. In starting this 
analysis, the court will once again state that each party should 
be awarded an equal share of the total value. The court has 
itemized the various items below. In its chart, the court has 
listed the item, plaintiff's estimated of value, defendant's 
estimated of value, and the court's final determination of value. 
Item P's value P's value Court's value 
1955 Ford $ 5,900.00 $ 900.00 $ 3,400.00 
1931 Town Sedan $15,400.00 $ 4,200.00 $10,500.00 * 
1926 Model T $14*,000.00 $ 5,600.00 $10,000.00 * 
1911 Model T $20,000.00 $ 8,000.00 $14,000.00 * 
1921 Fort Hotrod $15,500.00 $ 8,000.00 $14,000.00 * 
1973 Harley Davidson 
$ 3,500.00 $ 2,495.00 $ 2,495.00 1 
1986 Harley Davidson 
$ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 $ 7,000.00 
1986 Harley Davidson fit 
and sidecar 
Cushman scooters 
192 6 Roadster 
1979 Lincoln 
1982 Cadillac 
1992 Mustang 
Gas Pumps (3) 
Motor cycle trailer 
Flat-bed cycle 
Car hauling trailer 
16' flat bed 
trailer 
Model T trailer 
Model T wheels 
Wood Spokes 
Chain Hoist 
Total 
$ 
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9,000.00 
2,600.00 
1,500.00 
1,000.00 
1,300.00 
1,000.00 
3,500.00 
1,150.00 
350.00 
3,000.00 
1,200.00 
500.00 
400.00 
400.00 
500.00 
$108,700.00 
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,607.50 
,600.00 
100.00 
,450.00 
200.00 
0.00 
50.00 
500.00 
200.00 
800.00 
500.00 
500.00 
400.00 
0.00 
0.00 
,710.00 
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$79, 
,607.50 
,600.00 
100.00 
,000.00 
750.00 
0.00 
50.00 
825.00 
275.00 
,900.00 
850.00 
500.00 
400.00 
400.00 
0.00 
,652.50 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
* These values were determined by the testimony of the experts, as well 
as the parties. 
1 The experts testimony was closer to defendant's value. 
2 The court is satisfied that this roadster has been reduced to parts. 
3 The court accepts the plaintiff's testimony as being more credible, 
since she has possession of the automobile. 
4 The court is satisfied that the amount due on the loan exceeds the 
5 
cars value. 
5 The court is satisfied that the gas pumps only have salvage value. 
6 The defendant never contested this value. 
7 The court is satisfied the hoist is broken. 
As previously indicated/ these assets should be divided equally. 
Therefore, each party is awarded property having a value of $39,826.25. How 
the parties want to divide the property is up to them. The court would 
suggest that they either take turns picking from the list or that one party 
draw up two lists of property and the other party have first choice of 
lists. Any discrepancy in value can be made up in cash. 
In addition to the personal property listed above, the parties also 
dispute the values of their household goods. The court has addressed those 
items below. 
Milford Home 
Bedroom 
Living room 
Kitchen 
T.V./VCR 
Refrigerator 
Answering machine 
St. George Home 
Master Bedroom 
Bedroom 
Blinds 
Couches 
Music Center 
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P's Value 
$ 150.00 
$ 200.ffO 
$ 25.00 
$ 250.00 
$ 10.00 
$ 150.00 
$1,300.00 
$1,000.00 
$2,500.00 
$1,275.00 
$2,500.00 
D's Value 
$ 200.00 
$ 300.00 
$ 50.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Courts Value 
$ 1 7 5 . 0 0 
$ 2 5 0 . 0 0 
$ 3 7 . 5 0 
$ 2 5 0 . 0 0 1 
$ 1 0 . 0 0 1 
$ 1 5 0 . 0 0 1 
$ 1 , 6 5 0 . 0 0 
$ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
$ 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 1 
$ 1 , 1 3 7 . 5 0 
$ 2 , 2 5 0 . 0 0 
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$ 300.00 2 
$ 300.00 2 
$ 500.00 2 
$ 265.00 
$ 800.00 2 
$1,000.00 2 
$ 250.00 2 
$ 550.00 
$ 900.00 2 
$ 100.00 2 
$ 500.00 
$ 550.00 
$1,000.00 2 
$1,000.00 2 
$1,500.00 2 
$ 250.00 1 
$ 300.00 1 
$35,083.00 
1 The defendant either claimed no value for the item or didn't even 
list the item. 
2 The plaintiff either claimed no value for the item or didn't even 
list the item. 
3 The court found neither parties' estimate of value to be credible. 
The court intends to treat this personal property like all the rest. It 
should be divided equally between the parties. Each party should receive 
property having a value of $17,541.50. The defendant is awarded all the 
above listed personal property in the Milford home and the St. George 
condominium, except the $150.00 bedspread which was a gift to plaintiff. The 
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Couch 
Rocker 
Display case 
Lamps 
Serving table 
Rocking chairs 
Wall mirror 
Dining table/chairs 
Refrigerator 
Telephone 
Hutch 
Master bedroom 
Bedroom 
Bedroom 
Patio 
Misc. knickknacks 
VCR 
TOTAL 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
i $ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$19 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
30.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
0.00 
0.00 
100.00 
100.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
250.00 
300.00 
,640.00 
$ 300.00 
$ 300.00 
$ 500.00 
$ 500.00 
$ 800.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 250.00 
$1,000.00 
$ 900.00 
$ 100.00 
$ 900.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 
$1,500.00 
$ 0.00 
$ 0.00 
$37,800.00 
bedspread is awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is awarded all the 
above listed personal property in the Bountiful home, except the piano and 
the pool table. The piano and pool table are awarded to the defendant. In 
addition, each party is awarded any and all gifts they have received from 
their children. The value of the personal property awarded to defendant 
totals $19,875.00. The value of the personal property awarded to the 
plaintiff totals $15,208.00. This is a difference of $2,333.50 from an equal 
distribution. The defendant is ordered to pay the difference in cash to the 
plaintiff. 
Attorney's Fees 
The last issue is attorney's fees. In assessing attorney's fees, the 
court looks at the financial needs of the parties, as well as the financial 
ability of the parties to pay attorney's fees. The court also looks at which 
party may have prevailed on any or all contested issues. In this case, the 
plaintiff has incurred approximately $4,000.00 in attorney's fees and 
$350.00 in court costs. The defendant has incurred similar amounts. The 
plaintiff is in need of financial assistance in paying her attorney's fees. 
The defendant has the financial ability to assist the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff has not, however, prevailed on all of the contested issues. As a 
result, the defendant is ordered to contribute $2,000.00 towards the payment 
of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Each party is to bear their own costs. 
Plaintiff's counsel will please prepare Findings of Facts, Conclusions 
of Law and a Divorce Decree consistent with this ruling. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 1994. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
W. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
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